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ESSAY 
EQUAL RIGHTS, SPECIAL RIGHTS, AND 
THE NATURE OF 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
Peter J. Rubin* 
"Well, I'm opposed to discrimination in any form, but I don't favor 
creating special rights for any group. . . . But I'm totally opposed to 
discrimination. Don't have any policy against hiring anyone for his 
lifestyle or whatever - we don't have any policy of that kind, never 
have had in my office or will we have in the future." 
-Robert Dole, Republican nominee for President, 
October 17, 1996. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the continued belief held by most Americans that cer­
tain characteristics should not form the basis for adverse decisions 
about individuals in employment, housing, public accommodations, 
and the provision of a wide range of governmental and private serv­
ices and opportunities, antidiscrimination laws have increasingly 
come under attack on the ground that they provide members of the 
group against whom discrimination is forbidden with "special 
rights." 
The "special rights" objection has been voiced most strongly, 
but not exclusively, against laws that seek to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation. This line of attack has not always 
been effective, but it has achieved notable success. To give one re­
cent example, in February 1998, the people of Maine voted to re­
peal a relatively new state law prohibiting discrimination in 
employment, housing, public accomodations, and credit on the ba-
* VISiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1984, 
Yale; J.D. 1988, Harvard. - Ed. I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Laurence 
Tribe and Martha Minow of the Harvard Law School, Professor Michael Dorf of the Colum­
bia Law School, Professor Burt Neubome of the New York University School of Law, 
Professors Mike Seidman, Mark Tushnet, Alex Aleinikoff, Chai Feldblum, and Robin West 
of the Georgetown University Law Center, Professor Robert Schapiro of the Emory Law 
School and Professor Rick Pildes of the Michigan Law School for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful, too, for the comments of the participants in a 
faculty workshop af the Georgetown University Law Center at which this paper was 
presented. I would also like to thank Emily Guthrie without whose support and encourage­
ment this Essay would not have been written. 
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sis of sexual orientation.1 A leader of that repeal effort subse­
quently concluded that the vote demonstrated that "[t]he American 
people rejected the notion of special rights" for gay men and 
lesbians.2 
This special rights argument has not been limited to public cam­
paigns. Indeed, the rhetoric of special rights has now begun to 
move from popular discourse into the legal analysis of antidis­
crimination law.3 This movement presents a threat to efforts to 
achieve equality in the United States, for it suggests that courts may 
conflate antidiscrimination laws that essentially mirror the Consti­
tution's own command4 with affirmative action provisions whose 
constitutionality can be determined under current law only after 
they have been subjected to searching judicial scrutiny.5 
Addressing this special rights objection is thus extremely impor­
tant. It is important in the popular sphere, both because this rheto­
ric seems to resonate with many people and because it undoubtedly 
plays a role in shaping popular perceptions of the nature of all an­
tidiscrimination law.6 If popular support for the principle of an­
tidiscrimination erodes, the national goal of equality for all 
individuals without regard to their membership in certain groups 
will be pushed further from our grasp. And it is important jurispru­
dentially, because the continued viability of legislative attempts to 
prohibit discrimination may depend upon blunting its force. 
A first purpose of this Essay is to attempt to explain the success 
of the special rights objection to antidiscrimination law. To some 
extent the rhetoric of "special rights" or "special entitlements" may 
be used intentionally by opponents of new or proposed antidis­
crimination laws simply to confuse the public about the nature of 
1. See Maine Ballot Measure 1 (1997) (repealing 1997 Pub. Law, Ch. 205, formerly codi­
fied at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 4552 and 4553 (West 1997)). 
2. Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, 
at Al (quoting Randy Tate). 
3. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 
298 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998). 
4. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) ("[In jury selection] the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, just as it prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race."). 
5. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218-30, 237 (1995) (subjecting 
race-conscious affirmative action plans to strict scrutiny, while leaving open the possibility 
that such scrutiny will not invariably be found "fatal in fact" (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
6. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse 
of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 283, 300-01 (1994) (describing the way in which 
rhetoric may shape the public's understanding of contested policy questions). 
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those laws.7 One of the reasons the claim of special rights is rhetor­
ically powerful is because it tars antidiscrimination law with the 
brush of racial and gender preferences. Many Americans believe 
such preferences amount to discrimination against those who do 
not receive them, and that they are antithetical to the idea of equal 
treatment for all. 
Perhaps because the special rights line of argument has been 
understood as merely misleading, the most common response to the 
rhetoric of special rights until now has been that laws against dis­
crimination guarantee equal rights, not special rights. s Antidis­
crimination law, of course, is animated by the very idea of equal 
treatment. And, to the extent that the special rights argument gains 
its force from obfuscation, this defense should, at least potentially, 
prove effective. 
But the powerful and persistent resonance of the idea that an­
tidiscrimination law provides special rights or entitlements to those 
who are protected suggests that there may be more sustaining the 
special rights objection than supporters of antidiscrimination law 
have recognized. 
In this Essay I re-examine antidiscrimination law to identify cer­
tain characteristics of the law - or of those who seek its protection 
- that could lead people to be receptive to the idea that an expan­
sion of that law will confer "special" rights or entitlements. Part II 
identifies three such characteristics that may help explain the popu­
lar force of the special rights objection to laws prohibiting discrimi­
nation. The first two involve mechanisms by which the law 
operates, mechanisms that may lead people to believe the law re­
quires the provision of special treatment to members of the pro­
tected group. The third involves the persistence of particular 
normative beliefs about the specific people who seek legal protec­
tion against discrimination. 
The presence of such characteristics suggests that the language 
of special rights may reflect and in tum reinforce a perceived truth 
about antidiscrimination law. Acknowledgment of these character­
istics is thus likely to be a necessary prerequisite to any effective 
attempt to address this increasingly successful line of criticism of 
and attack on laws against discrimination. 
7. See id. at 302. 
8. See, e.g., Ralph Z. Hallow, Maine Votes to Repeal Gay Rights Law: Opponents of'Spe· 
cial Privileges' Sense 'Turning Point, ' WASH. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al (" 'Our opponents 
say we want special rights, but all we' re seeking is equal rights.' " (quoting David Smith, 
spokesman for the Human Rights Campaign, a leading gay-rights advocacy group)). 
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As this Essay will also demonstrate, the same characteristics of 
the law that can lead people to believe that equal rights laws pro­
yide special rights may, ironically, help to explain the failure of 
those laws to eradicate completely the sense of discrimination felt 
by those they are intended to protect, in the workplace and else­
where. Those who are supposed to be protected by laws that pro­
hibit discrimination of course often feel that they receive less than 
equal treatment, despite the laws against discrimination.9 A second 
purpose of this Essay is to suggest some ways - both legal and 
extra-legal - that these characteristics can be addressed, both so 
that laws against discrimination will be less susceptible to attack on 
the ground that they provide those whom they protect with special 
rights, and so that discrimination laws may be more effective in 
combating unequal treatment. 
Finally, although it is not the primary focus of this Essay, I will 
briefly argue in conclusion that the special rights objection should 
not call into question the continued value - or the constitutionality 
- of antidiscrimination law. Indeed, each of the aspects of antidis­
crimination law that may fuel the special rights objection actually 
reflects in its own way the continuing disadvantaged position of the 
members of the protected class. Far from demonstrating that an­
tidiscrimination laws are no longer useful in assuring equal treat­
ment for protected individuals - either because they are· 
unnecessary or because on balance they do more harm than good 
- the vitality of the special rights objection actually demonstrates 
the continued need for such laws. 
That antidiscrimination law may nonetheless be seen from some 
perspectives as providing special entitlements to the protected class 
in fact suggests only the limited utility of a binary equal rights/spe­
cial treatment disjunction for purposes of assessing the compatibil­
ity of legislative enactments with the conimand of equal protection. 
In particular, to the extent one's characterization of a particular 
provision reflects a normative judgment about the character of the 
class it protects, the use of these labels may actually invite courts to 
introduce into their analyses their own stereotyped ways of think­
ing. Different, more nuanced tools of analysis are therefore needed 
9. Cf., e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of 
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 167 
(1994) (observing that African Americans are more likely to be fired than white Americans); 
see also Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to 
Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147, 147-49 (1994) (noting that, despite antidis­
crimination laws, African Americans are made to feel like an "outlaw people" when they try 
to shop in retail stores). 
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to measure the consistency of any law with the constitutional man­
date to provide "equal protection of the laws." 
II. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS: THE NATURE OF 
ANT!DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Antidiscrimination law is the primary means by which organized 
society protects individuals against disadvantageous treatment on 
the basis of their membership in certain groups, archetypally racial 
or ethnic minority groups. An antidiscrimination law reflects a con­
clusion that a common characteristic of a group - for example, 
skin color, gender, or sexual orientation - ought not to form the 
basis for disqualifying its members from some good, for example, a 
job, a home, or the opportunity to serve one's country. The legal 
prohibition against governmental classification on the basis of char­
acteristics like these - characteristics that society has concluded 
should not matter in certain circumstances - is part of the funda­
mental law of the United States. It is enshrined in the Equal Pro­
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.10 
In popular discourse, the distinction between laws prohibiting 
discrimination against members of certain groups and affirmative 
action laws that provide special benefits to members of these 
groups is breaking down. Laws to protect members of different 
groups from discrimination are decried with increasing frequency 
on the basis that they will provide those groups with "special rights" 
or preferential entitlements. This characterization is used most fre­
quently to describe the extension of the protection of antidis­
crimination law to groups that have not previously been protected. 
The argument that antidiscrimination laws provide special treat­
ment for members of the group that is, or may be, newly protected 
from discrimination is thus frequently used to oppose laws that pro­
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, 
the opponents of municipal ordinances in Colorado prohibiting dis­
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation succeeded in enacting 
Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution, a ballot measure that 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For the classic discussion of the prohibition as a matter 
of equal protection against governmental classification on the basis of certain characteristics, 
see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 
341, 353-56 (1949). "No fully coherent theory . . .  has emerged" for defining those character­
istics whose use is constitutionally suspect under the Equal Protection Clause, although such 
factors as immutability, discreteness and insularity, and a history of stereotyping and discrim· 
ination have been cited as significant in various Supreme Court opinions. See Peter J. Rubin, 
Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1148-49 n.15 
(1987). 
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prohibited any such ordinances, largely through arguments that 
homosexuals should not be given special entitlements.11 Similar 
tactics were used in the recent successful campaign to repeal by 
popular referendum Maine's law protecting individuals from dis­
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.12 
Perhaps more troublingly, the language of special rights has be­
gun to appear in legal discourse concerning laws that prohibit dis­
crimination. In Romer v. Evans, in which Colorado's Amendment 
2 was invalidated, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this special 
rights rhetoric, concluding that "we cannot accept the view that 
Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does no 
more than deprive homosexuals of special rights."13 This con­
clusory language, however, was unsupported by clear reasoning. 
And despite it, the shift in rhetoric away from equal rights and to­
ward special rights has now begun to seep into legal analysis of an­
tidiscrimination laws. In particular, when the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently upheld the constitutionality of a popularly­
enacted Cincinnati City Charter amendment that prevents "the City 
. . . and its various Boards and Commissions" from prohibiting dis­
crimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orien­
tation, status, conduct, or relationship,"14 it said that the now­
proscribed laws against discrimination would have provided "spe­
cial rights" and "special privileges."15 
The idea that antidiscrimination law provides special rights is 
not limited to laws designed to protect homosexuals from discrimi-
11. The Amendment to the Colorado state constitution banning such ordinances was 
struck down on equal protection grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996). 
12. See, e.g., Susan Kinzie, PAC's Moniker Angers Supporters of Gay Rights Law, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Bangor, Me.), Oct. 25, 1997, at BS. 
13. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 {1996). 
14. CITY CHARTER OF CINCINNATI, Omo, art. XII. 
15. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 
296, 299-301 (6th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in October 1998. See 
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365 {1998). In an 
opinion respecting the denial of the petition for certiorari, Justice Stevens wrote that the 
district court's characterization of the city charter amendment "'merely [to] remove[ ] mu­
nicipally enacted special protection from gays and lesbians,' " created "confusion over the 
proper construction of the city charter." 119 S. Ct. at 365-366 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined 
by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari) (quot­
ing Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, 128 F.3d at 301). He argued that the meaning of 
the words used by the lower court "differs significantly" from a construction of the provision 
as "an enactment that 'bars antidiscrimination protection only for gay, lesbian and bisexual 
citizens."' 119 S. Ct. at 366 (quoting Petitioners' construction of the amendment). Justice 
Stevens concluded that the "confusion" caused by what he characterized as these two differ­
ent state-law constructions of the Cincinnati charter amendment "counsel[ed] against grant­
ing the petition for certiorari." 119 S. Ct. at 366. 
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nation. It has been used to describe the extension to other groups 
of legal protection against discrimination. For example, in response 
to a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir­
cuit that discrimination against the morbidly obese is sometimes 
prohibited under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a column in 
Time magazine decried the creation of a "new entitlement."16 
This characterization of laws that prohibit discrimination is par­
ticularly remarkable because it is made against a background of fa­
miliarity with the operation of such laws. Antidiscrimination laws 
are not untested; their consequences are not unknown. Rather, an­
tidiscrimination law is a familiar part of the legal landscape. It 
seems likely therefore that the special entitlement attack on laws 
that prohibit discrimination has power not merely because it may 
harness skepticism about affirmative action.17 The strength of this 
objection must also reflect some widely felt truth either about those 
antidiscrimination laws that people have already seen in operation 
or about the group to whom the law's protection has been or is 
proposed to be extended. 
Understanding the appeal of the special-rights characterization 
thus requires an examination not only of the theory behind antidis­
crimination law as it is understood by judges and legislators, but of 
its practical real-world effects on both those subject to it and those 
protected by it. These effects are important in understanding the 
reactions to new antidiscrimination laws, reactions both of people 
who are personally affected by the operation of antidiscrimination 
laws, and of those who have come into contact only indirectly and 
anecdotally with these laws' operation. Understanding the strength 
of the special rights rhetoric also requires an examination of peo­
ple's attitudes toward and understandings of the characteristics of 
those who seek the law's protection. The perceived effects of a rule 
16. Margaret Carlson, And Now, Obesity Rights, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 96 (commenting 
upon Cook v. Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hasps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st 
Cir. 1993)). Because the Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers in some circum­
stances to make "reasonable accommodation" for the disabled, it will sometimes directly 
mandate the provision to the disabled of special treatment. See Pamela S. Karlan and 
George Rufuerglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1996). Reasonable accommodation, however, was not the focus of the First Circuit's 
decision in Cook. 
17. Obfuscation, however, clearly accounts for some of its effectiveness. Indeed, Colo­
rado's Amendment 2 was actually written to prohibit "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orien­
tation, conduct, practices or relationships" from forming "fue basis of or entitl(ing] any 
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected 
status or claim of discrimination." See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. The placement of "claim of 
discrimination" \vithin a list that included "quota preferences" and other phrases that might 
suggest an entitlement to affirmative action appears to have been intended to obscure the 
meaning of fue state constitutional amendment. 
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of nondiscrimination will vary with an individual's perceptions 
about the nature of the class it protects. 
A systematic examination of the mechanisms by which antidis­
crimination law operates - something that has not been under­
taken before - reveals at least two distinct characteristics of the 
operation of the law that may result in a perception that antidis­
crimination laws create special rights. 
First, antidiscrimination law operates by prohibiting those sub­
ject to it from taking action with respect to certain individuals on 
the basis of their membership in one or another group. But the 
legal compulsion not to discriminate - although it is designed to 
ensure that members of a particular group are treated in the same 
way as all other individuals - does not by itself create a world in 
which the impulse toward discrimination is extinguished. The con­
sequence of this is that law alone cannot in all circumstances guar­
antee equal treatment. Rather it can provide only a second-best 
solution. One unintended consequence of imposing a rule of non­
discrimination upon a world that still may have the impulse to dis­
criminate is that many of those subject to the law's constraints are 
likely to feel as though they are required to provide special treat­
ment to members of the protected group. A second, ironically, is 
that those individuals who are protected by the law are likely to feel 
that they receive less than equal treatment. 
This suggests a fundamental limit on the ability of law alone to 
protect individuals from discrimination, and suggests that legal 
prohibitions of discrimination can work most successfully only 
when they are coupled with efforts to utilize other culturally influ­
ential tools to reform the attitudes that underlie the myriad human 
impulses to discriminate. 
Second, because antidiscrimination law uses an imperfect legal 
system to deter and to punish acts of discrimination, it can do so 
only imperfectly. Transaction costs inherent in litigating questions 
of discrimination and costs associated with erroneous outcomes in 
such litigation may lead those subject to the law of antidiscrimina­
tion to act differently toward those who are the objects of the law's 
protection than they would toward anyone else. Again, one result 
of this second characteristic of the law may be that employers, land­
lords, colleagues, and the like will develop a sense that the law re­
quires them to provide special treatment to members of the 
protected class while, again, members of the protected class will 
perceive that they are still treated less favorably than their peers. 
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This is a difficult problem to address, because some of these 
costs relate to the particular opprobrium attached to a finding of 
unlawful discrimination - opprobrium that is itself one of the goals 
of antidiscrimination laws. Others of these costs, however, may be 
addressed - at least in some measure - by rules designed to re­
duce the transaction costs involved in litigating claims of 
discrimination. 
Finally, the special rights rhetoric may have force in part not 
because of characteristics of the law, but because of perceived char­
acteristics of those who seek its protection. Indeed, there are many 
ways in which a failure to share the legislature's conclusion that 
members of a particular group are, in all morally relevant respects, 
similar to everyone else, can make a law prohibiting discrimination 
seem to require the provision of special rights. To the extent the 
special rights objection resonates because of beliefs of this kind, this 
problem can most effectively be addressed by integration and edu­
cation, which may help to eliminate the most virulent forms of prej­
udice and break down barriers to recognizing our shared 
humanity.18 
A. Characteristics of Laws Against Discrimination: The 
Prohibition on Generalization 
1. The Impulse to Discriminate 
Laws against discrimination operate by prohibiting decision 
makers from making decisions based on generalizations regarding 
particular characteristics. Such generalizations - which in this con­
text are called "stereotypes" - are made a forbidden basis for cer­
tain decisions. Employers, for example, are required to base their 
hiring decisions not on stereotypes about members of different ra­
cial groups, but upon an assessment of the relevant qualities of each 
individual applicant. 
This actually means that the characteristics whose use is forbid­
den are treated differently from most other human characteristics. 
We routinely and necessarily make decisions on the basis of gener­
alizations about various characteristics of the people we meet. In­
deed, conducting the interactions that make up our lives would be 
18. Of course there may be additional reasons for the staying power of the "special 
rights" rhetoric. For example, some may believe that antidiscrimination law leads inevitably 
to affirmative action, set-asides, and quotas which many people view as a provision of special 
rights or entitlements. For others, the language of entitlement may reflect nothing more than 
resentment against the disfavored class, and an attempt to create a socially acceptable argu­
ment against antidiscrimination laws. 
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an overwhelming and unmanageable task without the ability to do 
exactly this. Although individuals as a general matter are permitted 
to draw inferences about others based on generalizations about all 
kinds of characteristics, when an antidiscrimination law is passed 
suddenly one characteristic can no longer permissibly be used in 
decisionmaking, even when it may, in a particular social circum­
stance, form the basis for an accurate generalization.19 This is the 
insight that led Professor Strauss to argue that antidiscrimination 
laws actually draw attention to ethnic background and do not en­
force a regime of "colorblindness."20 
Professor Strauss thus posited that laws prohibiting discrimina­
tion on the basis of race - and I will in general use for purposes of 
illustration the archetypal example of laws prohibiting discrimina­
tion on the basis of race - indeed provide a type of special right:21 
those protected by the law are exempted from treatment that is 
based on generalizations about certain of their characteristics.22 
But the significance of this feature of the law goes far beyond 
this because the law does not, because it cannot, eliminate the im­
pulse to discriminate, to act on the basis of stereotypes. It does 
only what it can do: it stops the discriminatory impulse from being 
given effect. 
To the extent that a person believes, despite the passage of a law 
against discrimination, that a racial generalization is accurate, com­
pliance with antidiscrimination law will make that person feel that 
members of the protected group are receiving special treatment. 
And, ironically, as long as that belief in the accuracy of a racial 
generalization persists, the individual against whom discrimination 
is prohibited is unlikely to receive - or to feel as if she is receiving 
- genuinely equal treatment. Rather she is likely to be subjected 
to a particularly searching kind of scrutiny. 
These effects are independent of the content of the racial gener­
alization. They do not depend necessarily on a belief in the inferi­
ority of one or another group and are not necessarily a reflection of 
resentment about the necessity for providing equal treatment to in­
dividuals one may think are unequal. To see th� mechanism by 
19. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 99, 113 (1986). 
20. See id. 
21. Cf. id. at 117 (under antidiscrimination law, the characteristic of race is given "special 
treatment"). 
22. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (court deciding a child custody matter can­
not consider genuine potential harm to the child that it would otherwise consider when that 
potential harm arises from private racial prejudice concerning the remarriage of the child's 
mother to a man of another race). 
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which these effects occur, an example involving a racial generaliza­
tion, but no racial animus, will be useful. 
2. Discrimination Based on Accurate Generalizations: The 
Elevator Operator 
After the election in 1992 of many new African-American 
Members of Congress, there was an allegation that congressional 
elevator operators discriminated against one of them because she 
was an African-American woman. Congressional elevator opera­
tors are charged with guarding the Members-only elevators at the 
House of Representatives. They are supposed to know who all the 
Members of Congress are, and to permit only Members on the ele­
vators. They are supposed to deny entry to anyone who is not a 
Member. 
This is a difficult job, requiring the elevator operators to remem­
ber 435 different faces. Cynthia McKinney is a black congress­
woman first elected in 1992. (Her black-majority electoral district 
was subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court in Miller v. 
Johnson.23 In 1996 she was re-elected from a new, white-majority 
district that took its place.24) After coming to Congress, her entry 
to the Members' elevator was repeatedly challenged - indeed, she 
was similarly challenged by Capitol garage attendants and police 
officers.25 She charged that these challenges were the result of 
discrimination.26 
And maybe they were nothing more than a direct result of con­
scious racism. But we can imagine an elevator operator who would 
say - in good faith - that he was not racist. He did not remember 
Congresswoman McKinney, but sometimes he doesn't remember 
other Members of Congress either. He says he treats everyone 
equally. And maybe he does. (Indeed, we can imagine him saying 
23. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
24. See Congressional Race Surprise: Blacks Win Despite New Districts, NBWSDAY, Nov. 
11, 1996, at A6. 
25. See Bill Turque, The Class of '92, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 32, 35-38 (describing 
Congresswoman McKinney's treatment); Maureen Dowd, The New Women of Washington: 
Profiles of Women in Powerful Political Positions, COSMOPOLITAN, Oct. 1994, at 216, 220 
(same). 
26. See TV Monitor, THE HOTLINE, Aug. 26, 1993 (quoting Congresswoman McKinney's 
response on the Aug. 26, 1993, edition of Good Morning America to a question about 
whether she felt "pigeonholed" by being an African-American woman in Congress) ("I just 
have a problem gaining recognition, not from my colleagues, but from the support staff. Get­
ting onto Members only elevators, gaining access to the Cannon House Office Building, get­
ting even into committee meetings. The problem is one of having to defend one's presence 
on the Hill."); Turque, supra note 25, at 35 (describing Congresswoman McKinney's com­
plaint to House Sergeant-at-Arms Werner Brandt). 
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to himself "whatever my racial views, if I want to keep my job I'd 
have to be crazy to discriminate against black Members of 
Congress. ") 
Yet Congresswoman McKinney's complaint is real. How can 
our elevator operator's vision that he provides equal treatment be 
squared with the reality that Congresswoman McKinney is in fact 
challenged as she enters the elevator more frequently than her 
white colleagues? 
The answer may have to do with generalization. To begin with, 
we must examine the elevator operator's view of equal treatment. 
He lets on the elevator every Representative he remembers. But 
there's more at work here. He can't remember every Member of 
Congress. When he is unsure, he has to use other indicia that sug­
gest to him whether the person is a Member or not. In the House 
Office Building in which he works, the percentage of black women 
is lowest among the Members of Congress. Immediately before the 
arrival of McKinney's class of 1992, there had been only twenty-six 
African Americans in the House; even afterward there were only 
forty.21 Only ten of the 435 members were black women. 28 There 
is a higher percentage of black women in staff positions, and in­
deed, in the general population in Washington, than among the 
Members of Congress. Consciously or unconsciously,29 this circum­
stance may lead our elevator operator to make race-based 
generalizations. 
When the elevator operator is unsure about a white man in a 
suit, he may often take the risk of erroneously permitting him to 
enter the elevator. Some relatively high percentage of the time, he 
will have correctly permitted a congressman on, avoiding the em­
barrassment of asking him to identify himself. Undoubtedly he will 
also make a number of false positive assessments, permitting white 
men who are not Members to enter the elevator. Indeed, he may 
often think he recognizes the person, so that it may be someone he 
is sure is a congressman, but who actually is not. (Since not all 
Members of Congress know each other well, there may, for the 
same reasons, also be less likelihood that there will be complaints 
about these errors from other congressional passengers. ) 
27. See Stephen A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P.'s New Hope: Kweisi Mfume, N.Y: TIMES, Dec. 
11, 1995, at BS. 
28. See Laura B. Randolph, Sisters in the House, EBONY, Sept. 1994, at 20. 
29. Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 337-39 (1987) (articulating a cognitive psycholog­
ical explanation for unconscious racism). 
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When the elevator operator is unsure about a black woman, 
however, he is mathematically more likely to be correct if he ex· 
eludes her.3° For similar reasons, he is unlikely to mistake a black 
woman who is not a Member of Congress for someone who is, and 
to admit her erroneously. And, he is more likely to hear complaints 
from other Members of Congress about his admission to the eleva· 
tor of black women (even if he is correct every time). 
Yet the only way to provide truly equal treatment for black 
women and white men would be to admit the black women about 
whom the operator is unsure in the same proportion as the white 
men about whom he is unsure.31 
This is not likely to happen for several reasons. It may not even 
be possible. First, the system is supposed to prohibit admission of 
people who are not Members of Congress. The "false positives" 
admitted to the Members-only elevator are not authorized in the 
first place, so to require admission of additional people about 
whom the elevator operator is unsure would seem perverse. Even 
attempting to measure the false positives would be strange in light 
of the elevator operator's mission. And, as described above, the 
false positives may be unconscious, in that the operator may think 
he is admitting only Members of Congress. Simply instructing the 
elevator operator to ask for identification from everyone about 
whom he is unsure could still result in his asking black women for 
identification more often than white men or women. There is thus 
probably no way to replicate for black female Members of Congress 
the experience of white male Members of Congress. 
Whether the discriminatory treatment is conscious or uncon· 
scious, whe.ther it is based on actual probabilities or on distorted 
racist stereotypes, the law thus usually will be unable to alter in any 
immediate way an individual's impulse to discriminate. It usually 
will work only by preventing people from giving effect to their dis· 
criminatory impulses. 
In light of the probabilities that (we have assumed for present 
purposes) have resulted in our elevator operator's discriminatory 
conduct, the most efficient way for him to avoid the charge of dis· 
30. Professor Strauss has described discrimination on the basis of accurate generaliza­
tions about characteristics as "'[r]ational discrimination,' .. . a generalization of the econo· 
mists' notion of 'efficient discrimination."' Strauss, supra note 19, at 108 (citation omitted). 
To avoid the possible implication - one clearly not intended by Professor Strauss - that in 
some circumstances racial discrimination might be acceptable as a normative matter, I have 
chosen to avoid this formulation. 
31. Indeed, we have to count in this category also those men our elevator operator is sure 
are members of Congress but who, in reality, are not. 
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crimination is to memorize the black faces in Congress more care­
fully than the white ones. There are a relatively small number of 
black faces,32 and, although it will not stop him from incorrectly 
admitting a disproportionate number of white men to the elevator, 
the complaints of discrimination do not stem from these erroneous 
admissions. 33 
From the perspective of the individual bound by the rule of an­
tidiscrimination - in this case the elevator operator - the antidis­
crimination command thus actually requires (in the presence of a 
mathematically accurate generalization) what will feel like the pro­
vision of "special treatment" for black Members of Congress on the 
basis of their race, the characteristic upon which discrimination is 
now prohibited.34 
At the same time, notably, from the perspective of the person 
against whom discrimination is now prohibited, even a rule of an­
tidiscrimination will not guarantee equal treatment, since he or she 
will never receive the benefit of the doubt provided to people who 
belong to the majority group. Black Members may always be ad­
mitted to the elevator, but they will also always be more closely 
examined than Members who are not black. 
Indeed, this would be true even if a supervisor ordered an alter­
native response to complaints from someone like Congresswoman 
McKinney - requiring the elevator operator to ask for identifica­
tion even from the Members of Congress he recognizes. In addi­
tion, this would lead those who were already Members to feel that 
the complaints of minority Members of Congress had led to the de­
struction of part of the system of privilege that they long enjoyed. 
The black Members of Congress still would never receive the same 
treatment as had traditionally been given to (white) Members of 
Congress, and they would likely be faced with the additional bur­
den of the resentment of some of their colleagues. 
32. Although in our example there are not few enough, apparently, for him simply to 
remember them without some effort. 
33. In fact, it appears that memorization of Congresswoman McKinney's face was indeed 
the way in which her complaint was addressed. See Dowd, supra note 25, at 221 (McKinney 
"had so many frosty exchanges with elevator operators who tried to steer her out of 'Mem­
bers Only' elevators and guards who yanked her by the arm when she bypassed the tourists' 
metal detectors, she had to ask the House sergeant-at-arms to give them her picture to 
study."). 
34. Antidiscrimination laws may be evenhanded, protecting people of all races from dis­
crimination, but they provide what can be perceived as special treatment only for those who 
without the law would be victims of discrimination, in this case, the black Members of Con­
gress. Since members of the racial majority are not ordinarily victims of discrimination, the 
law will have little effect With respect to them. 
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Note that the two effects I have described above - on the indi­
vidual subject to the law and the individual protected by it - will 
occur whether the generalization upon which the decision maker 
would otherwise act is accurate (as it is in the case of mathematical 
probability facing the elevator operator) or not, so long as the per­
son who would otherwise be discriminating believes his generaliza­
tion is accurate. And indeed, the more accurate people think their 
race-based generalizations are - and thus the more justified their 
impulse to act upon those generalizations - the more strongly they 
will be inclined to feel that antidiscrimination law - which pre­
vents their acting on these impulses - requires them to provide 
protected individuals with special treatment. 
This suggests one basis for the view that antidiscrimination laws 
provide protected individuals with special treatment. It follows 
from the fact that law alone cannot immediately persuade people 
that race is not significant, and thus reflects one limit of the power 
of the law. Antidiscrimination law can prohibit acts of discrimina­
tion, but it can play only a limited role - essentially by communi­
cating the message that society has deemed one or another 
characteristic irrelevant to a particular series of decisions - in re­
moving the impulse to discriminate and in eradicating the views 
that lead people to have this impulse. Instead of creating a world 
without discrimination, antidiscrimination law superimposes a be­
havioral requirement upon a world in which, \vithout the legal re­
striction, some people would discriminate. Law alone can only 
imperfectly replicate a world without discrimination. 
3. Discrimination Based on Distorted Stereotypes 
The dual effect of the persistence of the impulse to discriminate 
- the feeling that special treatment is being provided coupled with 
the feeling that equal treatment is not being received - is exacer­
bated to the extent that the racial generalization in which a deci­
sionmaker believes but upon which he or she is forbidden to act 
relates - as racial generalizations, of course, most typically do -
to a stereotype about the qualifications or abilities of members of 
the minority group. If people believe (even unconsciously) that dis­
crimination itself with respect to some good is actually just, they 
will perceive antidiscrimination law to provide members of the pro­
tected group with unjustified deserts, i.e., special treatment. 
Thus, for example, the persistent belief held by some people 
that African Americans are, as a general matter, not qualified to 
hold particular jobs or not likely to be responsible tenants, or that 
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women are not likely to take their responsibilities at work as seri­
ously as men, may give rise to a consequent belief that the provision 
to a particular individual of something inconsistent with that gener­
alization about the group to which he or she belongs - for exam­
ple, a job or an apartment - is undeserved. If someone believed 
that a racial generalization that, for example, had previously pre­
vented blacks from serving in a particular job, was completely accu­
rate, he would view the presence of a black person in that job as 
provision of a special right. The very presence of that person in the 
workplace would seem, to someone who thought no African Amer­
ican could be qualified for the job, as visible evidence of special 
treatment. 
At the same time, on a personal level, the persistent belief in a 
stereotype may lead members of the class that is legally protected 
from discrimination to feel resentment from and close scrutiny by 
those around them once they have obtained the good that cannot 
lawfully be denied them on the basis of race. The belief in the va­
lidity of a racial generalization or stereotype need not be complete 
for this effect to be felt. It will be present when a member of the 
minority group confronts a person who believes that there is some­
thing to a racial generalization, even if he believes that a particular 
individual member of a racial minority group may nonetheless be 
qualified for a particular job or benefit. Such a person may believe 
that the underrepresentation of members of one group within, for 
example, a class of jobs reflects some objectively measurable char­
acteristic of members of that group. He may also believe, however, 
that one or another individual member of that group may, by his 
definition atypically, not share that characteristic.35 
Even when it exists only to this degree, the persistent sense that 
there is something about membership in a particular group that cor­
relates in general with ability, say to do a job or to live peacefully 
and responsibly in a house, undoubtedly will contribute to a kind of 
close scrutiny of any member of that group who serves in that job 
or lives in that house, regardless of the fact that he or she was found 
qualified at the time of hiring or sale. The member of the minority 
group will likely feel that he or she is being singled out for unfair 
treatment. Similarly, the colleague, employer, landlord, or neigh-
35. This type of partial belief in the validity of a racial stereotype may also in part explain 
two well-known phenomena: racist argumentation prefaced with the statement that "some of 
my best friends" are members of the group being disparaged, and the persistence among 
members of majority groups of the view that there are "good" members of the minority who 
don't exhibit (or exhibit only weakly) the negative characteristics attributed to the minority 
group. 
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bor who harbors this view is likely to count the human imperfec­
tions of the minority group member as confirmation of his or her 
unfitness, noticing imperfections that are neither searched for nor 
remarked in others. Again, the minority group member will not get 
the benefit of the doubt extended to everyone else. 
Indeed, the law may blunt the impact of the impulse to discrimi­
nate - and of the views that lurk behind it - only with respect to 
conscious decisions, and perhaps even then only with respect to the 
primary decision targeted by the law, for example, the initial deci­
sion whether to hire a person or to sell him property. If a person 
acts in a nondiscriminatory way only because of the law - that is, if 
his or her impulse to discriminate remains, but is not acted upon -
he or she may not in subsequent interactions treat the protected 
individual the same as he or she treats members of other groups. 
He or she may discriminate not only in attitude but in substance as 
well. Those who are subject to the law may not perceive themselves 
to be intentionally discriminating because they may not even be 
conscious of providing differential treatment. Thus, yet a further 
result may be that any complaints about this type of differential 
treatment may be poorly understood, resented, or felt as yet a fur­
ther demand for special treatment, rather than as an appropriate 
request to be treated equally. 
Addressing these effects of the imperfect fit between antidis­
crimination law and the goal of eradicating discrimination will be 
difficult. What must be addressed is not some technical problem of 
legal drafting, but underlying substantive beliefs. The effects of the 
remaining impulse to discriminate, even in the face of antidis­
crimination law, highlight the importance of culturally reinforcing 
two distinct messages: In contexts where the impulse is based on 
mathematically accurate generalizations, only a belief in the impor­
tance of treating members of the minority group as individuals will 
counterbalance whatever force the special rights objection gets 
from the collision between impulse and legal command. In the 
more typical case where the impulse to discriminate has its genesis 
in a stereotyped generalization about, for example, ability to do a 
job, the message must be reinforced that race, gender, sexual orien­
tation, and other similar characteristics are not relevant to the deci­
sion in question, the very conclusion that underpins 
antidiscrimination law in the first place. 
This latter message has been blunted with the resurgent view 
that there are immutable racial differences in such important char­
acteristics as intelligence. The publication, for example, of Charles 
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Murray's views, first in The New Republic,36 and then in the best­
selling book The Bell Curve, 37 contributes to an atmosphere in 
which it is acceptable once again to demean members of one racial 
or ethnic group as inferior to members of another. Similarly, the 
"Different Voice" school of feminist theory, which derives from the 
work of psychologist Carol Gilligan,38 has played a role in reinforc­
ing the view in our culture that there are immutable differences be­
tween men and women, many of which might, indeed, be relevant 
to ability to perform certain jobs. 
Further, the celebration of "political incorrectness," a supposed 
backlash against a purported hegemony of liberal ideology, in fact 
has helped to remove the social opprobrium that was, for some pe­
riod, attached to views that denied the essential equality of all 
human beings. 
In this regard, antidiscrimination laws will work most success­
fully - and will garner the most support - only to the extent that 
they operate in tandem with other forces that reinforce the view 
within our culture that, first, because of the importance of treating 
as individuals members of groups burdened by negative stereo­
types, the particular discrimination at issue is wrong, and that, sec­
ond, the characteristic at issue is in fact not relevant to the decisions 
with respect to which discrimination is prohibited. The more accu­
rate people think their race-based generalizations are (particularly 
those based on distorted stereotypes) - and thus the more justified 
their impulse to act upon those generalizations - the stronger will 
be their inclination to feel that antidiscrimination law provides the 
protected individuals with an entitlement to something that they 
don't deserve. Note, however, that to the extent that the effects I 
have described are the result of accurate generalizations that are 
based on the fact of disproportional racial representation in one or 
another setting, as, for example, in the case of our elevator opera­
tor, the most that can be hoped for is a sense that a higher value is 
served by avoiding racial generalizations. Education alone will be 
unable to mitigate completely the "special rights" effects. They will 
only dissipate to the extent that race no longer correlates with some 
relevant fact. 
36. Charles Murray & Richard J. Herrnstein, Race, Genes and I.Q. -An Apologia, NEw 
REP., Oct. 31, 1994, at 27. 
37. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CuRVE (1994). 
38. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
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B. Imperfections in the Legal System That Adjudicates Claims 
of Discrimination 
There is a second characteristic of the law that may contribute 
to the strength of the argument that it provides those it protects 
with a special entitlement. One entitlement or right that antidis­
crimination laws do undoubtedly provide to those they protect is 
the right to seek redress for acts of discrimination, usually through 
lawsuits or grievance procedures.39 Since discrimination typically is 
wrought against those in the minority, even when antidiscrimina­
tion laws are evenhanded - that is, even when they are not written 
in terms of protecting members of a particular group - this tool for 
vindication of the right against discrimination is primarily one given 
to members of the minority.4o Although it seems that this right to 
redress is not itself the special right of which opponents of antidis­
crimination law complain - their language appears to be focused 
on what they claim must be provided to individuals under antidis­
crimination law in the real world of, for example, the workplace, 
rather than on the once-removed world of the courtroom - the 
existence of this right to redress may create incentives for behaviors 
which they may perceive as the provision of special rights. 
The availability of this tool - the remedy that ensures the vital­
ity of the right not to be discriminated against - may cause those 
around a protected person to treat him or her differently than they 
otherwise would. The ancillary effects of the right to sue - or, per­
haps even more importantly, anecdotal stories about these effects 
- may well play a crucial role in creating the impression that an­
tidiscrimination laws provide special rights. And ironically, these 
same effects may well result yet again in the protected individual 
feeling that he or she is being treated differently from others, that 
he or she is in fact provided with different and less than equal 
treatment. 
These unintended consequences of the law against discrimina­
tion demonstrate the limit of the power of the law along another 
axis. For just as the command of antidiscrimination law cannot re­
move the discriminatory impulse from within the people subject to 
the law, so the legal system by which antidiscrimination law is en-
39. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) (setting out procedures for the enforcement of 
Title VII). 
40. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1969) (noting that although a city char­
ter amendment removed in an even-handed manner the City Council's power to address 
without the approval of a majority of the voters discrimination in housing on the basis of 
"race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry," "the reality is that the law's impact falls on 
the minority" because "[t]he majority needs no protection against discrimination"). 
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forced can only imperfectly determine when a discriminatory act 
has actually occurred. There are costs associated with litigating 
claims of discrimination, and costs associated with the risk of an 
erroneous adjudication of those claims. These costs are inherently 
imposed by antidiscrimination laws (as some of them are by all 
laws) that rely on the legal system for their enforcement. These 
costs create incentives to behavior that are not described in the text 
of statutes that, by their terms, simply prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of one or another characteristic. Imperfections in the legal 
system's ability to adjudicate claims of discrimination cause the law 
- despite its straightforward language - ultimately to send a 
message more complex than the simple command of equal 
treatment.41 
The legal system cannot precisely and costlessly assess the facts 
that give rise to disputes. Factfinders are not omniscient and 
human experience is complex. The legal system requires lines to be 
drawn between lawful and unlawful activity, but it is limited in its 
ability to draw lines against which conduct can be measured accu­
rately and efficiently. 
As trained lawyers we routinely assume away the imprecision 
and rough edges that are hidden by the judicial system. A judge or 
a jury makes a binary choice and its finding of fact - which may be 
arguable or even wrong - is used by the legal system inexorably to 
impose consequences. Although in addressing many substantive ar­
eas of law, law school trains lawyers not to be concerned with errors 
in deciding questions of fact, the possibility of such errors may be 
critically important ex ante in creating incentives in the real world, 
and, ex post, in determining whether members of society believe the 
laws under which they live are just and wor,thwhile. 
In the case of antidiscrimination law, the imprecision of the law 
is heightened by the difficulty of proving or disproving the fact that 
lies at the heart of what is forbidden by the law, that an action was 
taken with a discriminatory purpose.42 The risk of an erroneous 
determination is also increased in this context - at least for many 
41. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 l!AR.v. L. REv. 625, 632 (1984) (distinguishing "decision rules" designed to 
guide judicial conduct from "conduct rules" designed to guide public behavior and describing 
the way in which a decision rule may "as a side effect" send "a normative message" different 
from that sent by the underlying conduct rule). 
42. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993) ("Title VII . . . 
award[s] damages . . .  only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employ­
ment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race."); see also Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding that 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination). 
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Americans - by the kind and degree of opprobrium attached to a 
finding that one has discriminated.43 
As a consequence of the difficulty of proving or disproving in­
tent, the transaction costs involved in defending discrimination suits 
may lead those required not to discriminate to act in ways that they 
perceive as providing something extra to members of the protected 
class.44 Erroneous suits could be brought maliciously, or they could 
be brought because an employee, to use the workplace example, 
erroneously concludes that some disadvantageous treatment was 
based on race. A rational employer will try to protect itself from 
the costs of such erroneous suits. This may lead employers to treat 
members of a class protected by an antidiscrimination law with kid 
gloves, or, if the relationship starts to sour, to take special precau­
tions in documenting the interactions between management and the 
protected employee. The possibility of erroneous claims may at the 
same time make employees subject to the law against discrimina­
tion resentful, making them feel that protected individuals have a 
weapon - the claim of discrimination - under which they are con­
stantly threatened. 
Third parties who perceive the employer's defensive actions -
or who hear anecdotes purporting to describe such actions45 - may 
get the impression that protected employees are provided with spe­
cial treatment: they may appear to be exempt from some of the 
normal rules of the workplace, or the close scrutiny under which 
43. Of course the strength of the stigma attached to a finding of intentional race or gen­
der discrimination - a stigma that relies for its vitality in part on strong antidiscrimination 
laws - is a remarkable and positive reflection of the strength of the belief in antidiscrimina­
tion held by most Americans. 
44. A similar effect may be involved in other contexts, for example where doctors face 
potential liability for medical malpractice. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do 
Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q. J. EcoN. 353, 354 (1996) (assessing whether the 
costs of defending malpractice claims and the "fear of reputational harm" may lead doctors 
"to administer precautionary treatments with minimal expected medical benefit"). 
45. At least one commentator has suggested that employers will actually retain employ­
ees they would rather fire in order to protect themselves from lawsuits brought under em­
ployment laws including those prohibiting discrimination. See WALTER OLSON, THE ExcusE 
FACTORY 290 (1997) (contending that employers will "hold off taking action against problem 
employees" until they can "depersonalize dismissals" by undertaking them in the guise of "a 
purely economic layoff, "  what the author describes as "deadwood elimination by way of for­
est fires"). I know of no evidence that this practice occurs or that, if it does occur, it is 
widespread. Nonetheless, people's attitudes may well come to reflect a popular belief that 
such conduct is taking place. Cf., e.g., Howie Carr, MCAD Report is Enough to Cause Emo­
tional Distress, THE BosTON HERALD, June 12, 1998, at 4 (popular conservative columnist 
contending that it is extremely difficult to "fire an incompetent member of a politically pro­
tected class"). 
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they are put may create the impression that perhaps they do not 
legitimately belong in the company's workforce at all.46 
By the same token, the protected employee who finds herself in 
such a circumstance is likely to feel that she is not receiving equal 
treatment. She may perceive that she is being treated differently 
because of the fear of litigation. Some women report, for example, 
that unlike their colleagues who are men, they never find them­
selves alone in a closed-door meeting with a particular male supe­
rior.47 If an employee's interactions with management are more 
frequent or are more carefully documented than those of other em­
ployees, she may also perceive that she is subjected to stricter scru­
tiny than her colleagues. In addition, the employee may become 
aware of simmeting resentment against her. Not having sought any 
kind of special treatment, she may be unaware of ways in which the 
employer or her colleagues think she is being treated specially. Be­
cause the resentment will have no other apparent source, she may 
attribute it to sexism. (And, to the extent that her colleagues attri­
bute her special treatment to her gender, her perception will not be 
entirely wrong.) 
Again, and perhaps unsurprisingly, each of the effects I have 
identified with respect to the employer, the employee, and her col­
leagues, will be exacerbated enormously to the extent that the em­
ployer or the employee's colleagues do in fact harbor race- or 
gender-based stereotypes. Scrutiny designed to defend against 
claims of discrimination may dovetail with precisely the type of 
strict scrutiny, the absence of any benefit of the doubt, that I de­
scribed above. At its worst, the result could be a workplace in 
which the woman or minority employee feels beleaguered. 
It may also be that the type of "special" treatment that may be 
given by employers to members of protected classes in order to pre-
46. Here I describe the effects that fear of litigation may cause at the micro level. At the 
macro level it may also be that fear of litigation and the costs of defending a suit under Title 
VII may be leading employers to hire in a way that ensures racial balance in their work force. 
In this way, they may seek to avoid disparate impact litigation. This is the sense in which 
some may understand antidiscrimination law to lead inevitably to affirmative action. See 
supra note 18; Schacter, supra note 6, at 293 (arguing that the special rights rhetoric deployed 
in opposition to gay civil rights laws is intended to convey the message that such laws will 
lead, among other things, to job quotas). My impression, however, is that the special rights 
objection to antidiscrimination law does not involve anything so straightforward as the crea­
tion of quotas for members of the protected class. It appears, rather, to suggest primarily 
that protected individuals will be entitled under such laws to special treatment of some kind 
within, for example, the workplace. 
47. Cf., e.g., World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 27, 
1998), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript No. 98022705 (statement of Professor 
Vicki Schulz) (describing a company "that will not allow its male supervisors to give evalua­
tions to female subordinates behind closed doors without a lawyer present"). 
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empt any claim of discrimination may be wrongly perceived in ac­
tions in which the female or minority employee is rewarded on the 
merits, when another employee is not. Belief that this kind of be­
havior is taking place might make those members of the unpro­
tected group who have not been selected for the benefit in question 
(say a choice assignment) feel better about the way that they have 
been treated. A decision on the merits that favors a minority em­
ployee thus may be rationalized away as a reverse racial preference 
- a provision of a special right compelled by antidiscrimination 
law.48 In this regard, it may be difficult for a member of a minority 
group ever to receive appropriate recognition of her achievements. 
To the extent this second group of special rights effects is caused 
by antidiscrimination laws - and to at least some extent belief in 
these effects seems to be rooted more in urban legend than in fact49 
- it may be even less remediable - whether through changes in 
the law or through extra-legal education - than those caused by 
the persistent belief in race- or gender-based generalizations. 
Although a breakdown of racial stereotyping doubtless would ease 
some of these effects, so long as there are costs associated with liti­
gation and a finding of liability, they are likely to persist. 
As a first step, additional empirical research is needed into 
whether and to what extent employers are taking defensive actions 
in dealings with employees from protected classes. Much of the evi­
dence of such behavior seems to be anecdotal. If these conse­
quences are less pervasive than people think, publicizing that fact 
may help dampen these "special treatment" effects. 
To the extent such behaviors do occur, the employer could erad­
icate some of these problems by treating everyone as it treats its 
protected-class employees, but this is extraordinarily unlikely. The 
costs - financial and human - would be enormous. It would re­
quire a complete transformation of the nature of the workplace and 
of the employer-employee relationship. Indeed, it is possible that 
such a transformed workplace, one in which all interactions are 
carefully documented, etc., might actually be impossible to main-
48. Cf. Interview - Affirmative Action: Don't Buy the Hype, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 10, 
1995, at 18 (Interview with Christopher Edley, Associate Director, Office of Management 
and Budget, Mar. 31, 1995) (observing that when a woman is selected from among 10 appli­
cants for a job, each of the unsuccessful male applicants may conclude that he was a victim of 
reverse discrimination - and further observing that, indeed, each may be so told by the 
person who did not hire him if that person concludes this would be easier than telling the 
truth - even though, had the woman not been hired, only one of them would have gotten 
the position she was selected to fill). 
49. See supra note 45. 
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tain simply as a matter of human nature. And, of course, just as we 
saw before in the elevator operator example, the woman employee 
or the member of the racial minority group would still not receive 
the kind of treatment employees had received prior to the institu­
tion of the prohibition on discrimination. 
Reducing the costs of litigation - for example through the use 
of systems of alternative dispute resolution - might of course be 
helpful in some degree. Shifting the burden of proof, too, could 
reduce these effects, but only at an unacceptably high cost. To con­
tinue with the example of employment, once the law prohibits dis­
crimination, the burden of proof regarding unexplained 
employment actions must lie on one party or the other. At least 
with respect to race and gender, as recently as 1991 Congress, in an 
act signed by President Bush, decided that the risk that discrimina­
tory intent lay behind employment actions that had a disparate im­
pact on members of a particular group was great enough to justify 
placement of the burden of producing a non-discriminatory justifi­
cation on the employer.50 That judgment seems right. The alterna­
tive would not make the burden lighter. It would just impose the 
cost on some who have actually suffered discrimination, leaving 
more cases of discrimination unredressed, and rendering the law a 
weaker deterrent of discriminatory action.s1 
It also might be useful for proponents of antidiscrimination laws 
to try to make sure that laypersons understand more clearly the 
sources of fallibility in the legal system - that there are costs in­
volved in proving the human state of mind, and that the legal sys­
tem is inherently incapable of perfect accuracy in determining this 
question. But this would have as a concomitant effect some reduc-
50. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codi­
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)) (overturning War� Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989)). Of course, Title VII does not directly require race-based hiring to prevent a 
disparate racial impact. Employers may use any race-neutral hiring policy that is a business 
necessity even if it has a disparate racial impact on the composition of the employer's work 
force. 
51. The risks of erroneous determinations involved in litigation - coupled with anecdo­
tal evidence that juror sympathy results in indefensible verdicts in favor of plaintiffs - and 
the inefficient incentives they create are sometimes put forward to justify proposals for the 
reform of tort law generally. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LmGATION EXPLOSION 152-
66 (1991) (arguing that broad rules of admissibility can mislead juries into incorrectly impos­
ing liability). Although there may be particular procedural features of the legal system that 
increase the likelihood of an erroneous verdict and that might be modified, some imperfec­
tion is inherent in our system of permitting a human jury to make determinations of matters 
of historical fact, such as intent, that may give rise under various substantive laws to a finding 
of liability. (And indeed, proposals for the reform of the legal system frequently appear to 
involve little more than veiled arguments - perhaps ones too objectionable to be made 
openly - that the costs of that system outweigh its benefits. See, e.g., id. at 315-16.). 
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tion in the deterrent and punitive value of judgments of liability and 
of the law itself. 
C. The Perceived Character of the People Within the 
Protected Class 
Finally, it is essential to explore one additional explanation for 
some of the success of the special rights attack on antidiscrimina­
tion laws. This is the possibility that, to some extent, people are 
receptive to the idea that antidiscrimination law extends special 
rights to members of particular groups, not because of something 
about those laws, but because of some widely shared perception 
about members of the particular groups to whom the protection of 
antidiscrimination law has been or is proposed to be extended. 
Although most people who articulate the special rights objection 
argue at the same time that they oppose discrimination,52 some do 
not. It may be that some people view certain groups that antidis­
crimination law seeks to protect as morally unworthy of protection 
against discrimination. They may believe that individuals who 
share one or another characteristic are not fit to be full and equal 
members of society. As a consequence, these people may under­
stand the adoption of antidiscrimination laws to confer a special 
right in the sense that those laws' protection is undeserved. 
This perception probably plays a substantial role in sustaining 
the resonance of the special rights message. Indeed, those who ar­
gue that laws that prohibit discrimination against homosexuals actu­
ally provide special rights have sometimes argued that this is 
because homosexual conduct is disgusting or immoral, and that it 
therefore forms a proper basis for discrimination.53 Much of the 
objection to laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation of course comes from those who, for religious or other 
reasons, believe that homosexuality is sinful, morally repulsive, or 
disgusting. 
52. See, e.g., Second Presidential Debate Between President Bill Clinton and Senator 
Bob Dole (Oct. 17, 1996) (statement of Senator Dole) (transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, News Group File). 
53. Thus, a proposed Washington state initiative that would have prohibited discrimina­
tion in employment against homosexuals on the basis of sexual orientation - an initiative 
that was defeated in 1997 - was opposed at least by some on the ground that it provided "a 
special right" because "no one bas the right to immunity from disapproval or rejection based 
on character or conduct. You are not protected from being denied services, housing or em­
ployment because someone . . . finds your conduct disgusting or immoral." Larry 
Rambousek, Letter to the Editor, Defining Gay Rights, THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, 
Wash.), Oct. 24, 1997, at BS. 
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Similarly, another group for whom protection against discrimi­
nation has been described as a special entitlement, the morbidly 
obese, are also undoubtedly widely viewed with disgust by members 
of our society. Indeed, numerous studies reveal that the public has 
feelings of "repulsion and disgust" for the obese.54 
To some extent, the view that members of certain groups are 
undeserving of protection against discrimination because they are 
immoral or disgusting may depend upon (although it is of course 
not fully explained by) a conclusion that they are responsible for 
their own inclusion in the disfavored category, that membership in 
the group at issue is the result of a volitional act. Thus, opponents 
of gay rights argue that homosexuals have chosen a sexual prefer­
ence - despite the substantial scientific evidence to the contrary55 
- or that what is objectionable about homosexuals is the voluntary 
sexual conduct in which they engage.56 In this regard, these objec­
tions may, at least superficially, appear to reflect the traditional 
view that one of the signs that discrimination is impermissible is 
when it is directed against characteristics that, like race, are 
immutable.57 
But the deeper objection seems to be to the character of the 
disfavored people themselves. For example, in upholding the Cin­
cinnati City Charter amendment that prevents the City or any of its 
boards or commissions from prohibiting discrimination against 
homosexuals and bisexuals on the basis of sexual orientation, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit described as a 
54. Jayne B. Korn, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25, 64 (1997) (quoting Harlan Hahn, Feminist 
Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. & 
WOMEN'S STUD. 97, 109 (1994)). 
55. See e.g., Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protec­
tion Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 
817-21 (1984); see also National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on Marriage 
and Family, Always Our Children: A Pastoral Message to Parents of Homosexual Children 
and Suggestions for Pastoral Ministers, reprinted in NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Oct. 10, 
1997, at 9 ("Generally, homosexual orientation is experienced as a given, not as something 
freely chosen."). 
56. See supra note 53; cf. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b )(2) (1994) (codifying the Department of De­
fense's "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy which requires the discharge of any member of the 
military service who merely "state[s] that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual" purportedly 
because of a rebuttable presumption that such a person "engages in, attempts to engage in, 
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts"). 
57. Of course, immutability has never been the sine qua non of antidiscrimination law. 
For example, discrimination on the basis of religion does not target an immutable character­
istic. By the same token, discrimination against conduct is not inherently immune from legal 
proscription. One can readily imagine, for example, a prohibition on discrimination against 
those who participate in particular religious conduct that members of the majority find dis­
gusting or immoral. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 535-36 (1993) (striking down law "targeting" practice of animal sacrifice by members of 
the Santeria religion). 
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"special privilege[ ] and preference[ ] . . . the legally sanctioned 
power [of homosexuals protected by antidiscrimination laws] to 
force employers, landlords, and merchants to transact business with 
them."58 The implication is clear that it would be eminently ra­
tional to want not to transact business even at arm's length with a 
homosexual person. The impression is palpable that one could one­
self become soiled or tainted in some way by such contact, and 
there is no suggestion that this is because of voluntary homosexual 
conduct, rather than the status of the other person as a homosexual. 
The idea of immorality and the potential for corruption is a fas­
cinating component of people's motivation to discriminate against 
members of one or another group. It was most obviously present in 
the anti-Jewish ideology of Nazi Germany, which viewed Jews as 
alien vermin who had infected and could destroy the otherwise pure 
German nation.59 But it is a part of the history of American dis­
crimination on the basis of race as well. Thus, although it is difficult 
for us today to imagine it, during the period before Brown v. Board 
of Education60 one of the strongest bases for the view that segrega­
tion should be preserved was the perceived moral corruption of Af­
rican Americans,61 and some sense that, as a consequence of this, 
contact with them could corrupt or contaminate white people. 
A description of this sense can be discerned in the 1896 dissent­
ing opinion of the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson. 62 He 
wrote that the "separate but equal" laws that he would have struck 
down "proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior 
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches 
occupied by white citizens."63 Such laws, he concluded, reflected 
concern about "the possibility that the integrity of the white race 
may be corrupted . . . by contact on public highways with black 
58. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296 
(6th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 
59. Thus, for example, Heinrich Himmler told SS leaders in 1943 that "[w]e had the 
moral right, we had the duty . . .  to destroy this people . . . . We have exterminated a bacte· 
rium because we do not want . . .  to be infected by the bacterium and die of it." 3 NAZISM 
1919-1945, at 1200 (J. Noakes & G. Pridham eds., 1988). Similarly, Hans Frank, the Nazi 
German Administrator of annexed Polish territory stated that Jews "were a lower species of 
life, a kind of vermin, which upon contact infected the German people with deadly diseases." 
ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DocroRS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
GENOCIDE 16 (1986). 
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
61. See, e.g., Kimberle Wtlliams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor· 
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1373 (1988) 
(identifying immorality as one of the traditional negative images of African Americans). 
62. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
63. 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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people."64 He concluded that, consistent with their proponents' 
view of the "degraded" or tainted nature of African Americans, the 
purpose of such laws was the "humiliati[ on of] citizens of the 
United States of a particular race."65 
The same view is described in the Court's opinion in Brown v. 
Board of Education itself, which speaks of a stigma wrought by seg­
regation so profound that it may be difficult to imagine in our cur­
rent historical circumstances. There the Court wrote that "[t]o 
separate [schoolchildren] . . .  of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone. "66 
An example from outside the legal sphere may make the case 
even plainer. One can see the popular strength of this sense of dis­
gust as late as 1947 in the reaction of many white spectators to the 
appearance of Jackie Robinson, the first African-American Major 
Leaguer, on the same baseball diamond as white players. Their 
conception of black people was reflected in the comments of mem­
bers of the family of Robinson's Brooklyn Dodger teammate Pee 
Wee Reese who expressed the view that, by playing shortstop next 
to a black second baseman, Reese was "in danger of being 
contaminated. "67 
This kind of emotional sense of the immoral or disgusting na­
ture of the members of the group that seeks the protection of the 
law - and of the risk of contamination and corruption they repre­
sent - may play at least some role in the perception that, when 
they seek protection from discrimination, they seek an unjustified, 
and thus special, right. Ironically, to the extent that it does, the 
resonance of the special rights argument is actually evidence of pre­
cisely the kind of irrational prejudice that can - as in the case of 
race - justify in the first place a prohibition on discrimination.68 
Some individuals may hold a somewhat weaker version of the 
view I have just described. An individual may believe that mem-
64. 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
65. 163 U.S. at 560, 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
66. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). 
67. See JuLES TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND His 
LEGACY 193 (expanded ed. 1997). 
68. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting 
that strict scrutiny of certain classifications is justified because "prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities" may interfere with the ordinary operation of the political process on 
which members of such minority groups could otherwise rely for protection); Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 713, 731-40 (1985) (arguing that 
"prejudice" is the key to determining which groups require protection from discrimination). 
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bers of a particular group are not entitled to full membership in 
society without necessarily believing that he or she will be cor­
rupted by them. To make this more concrete, imagine you think 
that gamblers, prostitutes, and homosexuals are all "undesirables" 
in the same way, and that, consequently, you don't want to associ­
ate with any of them.69 You would not have to believe that you 
could be contaminated by these people to believe that giving them 
protection from discrimination would be undeserved. 
And, while some who don't share the normative conclusion 
about gay men and lesbians reflected in laws prohibiting discrimina­
tion against them would doubtless argue that discrimination against 
them should be permitted, to others a disadvantageous decision 
made with respect to a gay person may not even be understood as 
"discrimination" - which may connote a normative judgment that 
such action is not just - because it treats the disadvantaged person 
similarly to those who are similarly situated. 
To go back to our gamblers, prostitutes, and homosexuals exam­
ple, one who viewed these people as objectionable might not think 
of a decision not to do business with them as "discrimination," be­
cause it would be, in his or her view, the appropriate way of treating 
individuals who have the characteristics these groups share. More 
important, at le�st from the standpoint of this Essay, a law prohibit­
ing discrimination against homosexuals might be perceived by such 
a person to provide them (unlike members of similar groups, prosti­
tutes and gamblers) with a kind of special right, indeed, with some­
thing that would seem very much like affirmative action. For until a 
person shares the conclusion that gay people are the same in all 
relevant respects as everyone else entitled to full membership in 
society, the command of antidiscrimination contained in the law 
may actually force him or her to depart from what he or she per­
ceives as a rule of neutrality with respect to homosexuals.70 
69. See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. § 4-37(a)(2)(c) (Michie 1958) (codification of a 1956 law 
providing for the revocation of a bar's liquor license if it should become a "meeting place" 
for, inter alia, "drunks, homosexuals, prostitutes . . .  [or] gamblers"). 
70. To the extent that one felt that homosexuality rendered a person unfit only with re­
spect to particular public or private goods or services - marriage, say, or employment as a 
schoolteacher - one might see the provision of special rights precisely in the protection from 
discrimination granted with respect to those particular goods and services. 
The protection of antidiscrimination Jaw may also seem undeserved in a sense related to 
that described in the text: the sense that it is an unnecessary response to a problem that is 
not adequately pervasive or important to warrant the same legal prohibition that has been 
adopted with respect to race- and sex-discrimination. To one who held this belief, the law 
might seem "special" in the sense that it amounts to "special interest" legislation, rather than 
legislation that serves a broader, public interest. The idea of the newly protected group as a 
"special interest" also may dovetail with the prejudiced views about the group described in 
the text. In this regard, see, for example, Justice Scalia's remarkable dissent in Romer where 
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The Supreme Court in Romer appears to have understood the 
"special rights" objection to laws prohibiting discrimination against 
homosexuals as the reflection of a view that, because of something 
in their very nature, gay men and lesbians did not deserve protec­
tion from discrimination. The Court said 
The State's principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that 
it puts gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons. So, 
the State says, the measure does no more than deny homosexuals spe­
cial rights. This reading of the amendment's language is 
implausible. . . . 
. . .  The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, 
specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, 
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies . . . .  
. . . [E]ven if, as we doubt, homosexuals could find some safe har­
bor [from discrimination] in laws of general application [prohibiting 
"arbitrary discrimination"], we cannot accept the view that Amend­
ment 2's prohibition on specific legal protections does no more than 
deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the contrary, the amend­
ment imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homo­
sexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek 
without constraint. . . . We find nothing special in the protections 
Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by 
most people either because they already have them or do not need 
them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless 
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic 
life in a free society.71 
Although the Court purported not to make any judgment about 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation per se - purport­
ing instead to apply the rational basis scrutiny that would have been 
applied to a similar discrimination wrought against any group72 -
the conclusion included in the Court's quoted discussion that 
Amendment 2 in repealing pre-existing antidiscrimination laws 
("withdraw[ing] . . .  specific legal protection"73) removed protection 
he said that "those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate 
numbers in certain communities" - he mentions "New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
and," anticlimactically, "Key West" - "have high disposable income," and "possess political 
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide." Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 517 U.S. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(referring to "the geographic concentration and the disproportionate political power of 
homosexuals"); 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision favoring laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation "reflect[s] the views and values 
of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn"). These characterizations -
of cosmopolitanism, wealth, and disproportionate power - have unfortunate resonance with 
those that have historically been used by antisemites to describe Jews. 
71. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626-27, 631. 
72. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-36. 
73. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. 
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that was deserved (i.e., "safeguards that others enjoy . . .  [,] protec­
tions [that are] taken for granted by most people either because 
they already have them or do not need them"74) belies that claim. 
It suggests that the Court understood the special rights objection to 
be an objection to the normative conclusion that homosexuals are 
entitled to protection from discrimination. The Court's rejection of 
the special rights argument appears to reflect its own conclusion 
that, as a normative matter, gay men and lesbians are indeed enti­
tled to such protection. 
The special rights objection undoubtedly obtains much of its sa­
lience from normative beliefs about the justice of protecting the 
group in question from discrimination. This connection may help 
explain an apparent paradox: traditionally structured antidis­
crimination laws that protect gay men and lesbians are criticized for 
providing "special rights," language of disapproval most commonly 
associated with affirmative action provisions. At the same time, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),75 an antidiscrimination 
law that has an unusual feature requiring "reasonable accommoda­
tion" for people with disabilities, that is, actually requiring the dis­
abled to be directly provided with special treatment, appears 
nonetheless to be more uniformly (albeit not universally) accepted 
as a "traditional" antidiscrimination law, a law designed to provide 
equal treatment.76 This is perhaps because, as between these two 
protected groups, the disabled are more widely thought deserving 
of legal protection from discrimination. 
Finally, an even weaker version of the beliefs I have described 
about the nature of homosexuality is possible, one that would ani­
mate yet a different view that may be present to some extent in the 
rhetoric of special rights. This is the view that one would not one­
self discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but that it would 
provide gay people with a "special right" to require others to act in 
the same way. 
This type of rhetoric - I wouldn't do X, but I wouldn't deny 
someone else's right to - is, at least of late, unfamiliar in the an­
tidiscrimination arena. It is more typical of discourse about civil 
liberties. Classically we hear people say "I wouldn't get an abortion 
74. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
75. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994). 
76. Cf. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 40 (concluding that "reasonable accom­
modation" under the ADA is "affirmative action" but that "the affirmative action involved in 
reasonable acco=odations" under the statute "can readily be distinguished from impermis­
sible discrimination"). 
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myself, but I wouldn't deny someone who felt differently the right 
to get one." This rhetorical structure reflects a conclusion that the 
activity - deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy or deciding 
whether to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation - has 
some preferred status, despite the speaker's own conclusion that 
she should not herself engage in it. 
In this perspective, the provision of a right against discrimina­
tion might seem "special" because it interferes with what one might 
view as a more important right not to associate with those who seek 
the law's protection. The idea that one would not oneself discrimi­
nate, but that others should be protected in their decisions to do so, 
reflects an incomplete belief that the group seeking the law's pro­
tection against discrii:nination (e.g., homosexuals) is analogous in 
relevant respects to those groups that have archetypally been un­
derstood to deserve the protection of antidiscrimination law (e.g., 
African Americans). Indeed similarly, before society had truly in­
ternalized the belief that race was not relevant to the propriety of 
an individual's full participation in the life of the community, the 
view held substantial sway that a (white) individual's right not to 
associate with (black) people on the basis of their race should sig­
nificantly limit the scope of antidiscrimination law even in the pub­
lic and commercial spheres.77 
To the extent the special-rights view is based on a sense that 
members of a particular group are alien, disgusting, and therefore 
unworthy of protection, the weapon most likely to weaken it is ac­
tually the open integration of members of that group into broader 
society. Ending the insularity of groups the majority finds degraded 
can undoubtedly break down the sense that interaction with mem­
bers of these groups will somehow taint members of the majority. 
The same is true of those less virulent forms of this belief that a 
group's members are different in a fundamentally relevant way 
from others who are entitled to participate fully in society. There is 
historical evidence that this works. For although there is undoubt­
edly still anti-black prejudice in the United States, since the adop­
tion in the early 1960s of laws prohibiting racial discrimination and, 
indeed, the adoption in some quarters of affirmative action plans 
designed precisely for purposes of racial integration, it is at least 
clear that the view that African Americans are inherently degraded 
77. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 {1959) (stating that only black schoolchildren's right to associate with 
white school children could justify the Court's segregation decisions, but "integration forces 
an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant"). 
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or corrupt in some infectious sense is no longer widely held. Nor 
does one normally hear, at least in recent years, that African Amer­
icans ought to be excluded from the social and economic life of the 
country. Nor indeed does one normally hear that African Ameri­
cans as a class can properly be excluded on the basis of their race 
from any avenue of public or commercial life simply to protect the 
associational rights of others. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
That there are some perspectives from which antidiscrimination 
law will appear to provide protected individuals with "special" 
treatment should not be mistaken for a conclusion either that an­
tidiscrimination law has lost its value or that it may appropriately 
be treated under current doctrine as constitutionally suspect. In 
fact, each of the characteristics I have catalogued that may lead 
people familiar with antidiscrimination laws to view them as provid­
ing special rights demonstrates the continued need for such laws: 
The first characteristic - that law operates upon action, not im­
pulse - is only significant where the impulse to discriminate re­
mains strong. The second, which is rooted in the costs of litigating 
antidiscrimination suits, requires that such claims be plausible, and 
that a judge or jury might easily be persuaded that a mistaken or 
wrongful claim had merit. This, too, depends upon the continued 
widespread presence of discrimination within society.78 Finally, the 
third reflects prejudice, a normative belief that discrimination is ap­
propriate. The presence of such prejudice itself demonstrates the 
continuing need for a law prohibiting discrimination. 
Indeed, the reality that, even in the face of discrimination, a law 
to prohibit it may have characteristics that can result in the provi­
sion of what may seem like special treatment illustrates the limited 
utility of the equal rights/special preferences distinction the Court 
has used until now for assessing laws' compatibility with the com­
mand of equal protection. What is needed instead is an approach 
that focuses on the characteristics and operation of the particular 
law at issue: In what way is it said to require the provision of spe­
cial treatment? Is this a primary or incidental effect of the law? 
What injury does the law allegedly inflict? What purpose does it 
advance? 
78. Thus if, for example, a law was passed prohibiting discrimination against people born 
on odd-numbered days, no one would suggest that the law provided the protected individuals 
with special rights in the second way I have described because any claim that they brought 
that they were discriminated against on the basis of day of birth would be most implausible. 
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In this regard the "special rights" label obfuscates more than it 
clarifies, and has more power as a conclusion than as a tool of anal­
ysis. Indeed, to the extent the label reflects a normative judgment 
about the people the law against discrimination would protect, it 
will be of little use to a court itself charged with avoiding stereo­
typed thinking in assessing the constitutional validity of the laws 
before it. Questions like those outlined above will provide much 
more information than the words "equal" and "special" about the 
consistency of any given provision with the command of "equal pro­
tection of the laws." 
The Constitution itself contains an antidiscrimination command. 
It would be strange indeed to discover that a statute that operates 
in a precisely parallel manner might be constitutionally suspect. 
From certain perspectives laws that prohibit discrimination may be 
described as requiring (or predictably resulting in) the provision of 
special rights. But so long as the perspectives from which they can 
be so described reflect the persistence of a view that members of 
the protected class are not equal to others, courts should under­
stand the primary effect of such laws to be the prohibition of dis­
crimination. To the extent the special rights effects could ever be 
cognizable by a court, they ought therefore to be treated as what 
they are: unintended, incidental, and largely unavoidable conse­
quences of prohibiting those who would discriminate from doing so, 
costs that are clearly outweighed by the continuing benefits of the 
legal proscription of discrimination. 
In the public sphere, so long as the idea remains powerful that 
"special rights" are offensive, proponents of laws against discrimi­
nation will have to address the characteristics of the law that may 
lead the special rights objection to have resonance. Antidiscrimina­
tion law may be perceived from some perspectives to provide pro­
tected individuals with special treatment. A candid explanation of 
the ways in which this supposedly special treatment is actually 
worse and different from the treatment members of the majority 
expect, may help to blunt the force of the special rights objection. 
In addition, those who would seek to guarantee equal treatment for 
all must embark on a broader strategy - often discussed, but rarely 
employed - in which the legal prohibition against discrimination is 
but one of many cultural mechanisms deployed to achieve that 
equality. The strength and nature of the special rights objection 
suggests that law is necessary - both because of its primary effect 
to prevent and punish discrimination and as an expression of soci-
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ety's rejection of such discrimination - but not sufficient to ad­
dress discrimination. 
Failure to proceed with a multifaceted strategy will not only re­
sult in the partial failure to eradicate the problem of discrimination, 
it will leave antidiscrimination law itself increasingly vulnerable to 
attack not in the courtroom, but in the public arena: expansion and 
enforcement of the laws against discrimination may become in­
creasingly unpopular, despite a continuing fundamental national 
belief in the theory of equal treatment. Indeed, as the success and 
appeal of the special rights rhetoric may reflect, a failure ade­
quately to take into account and address some of the unintended 
consequences of antidiscrimination laws could ultimately lead to a 
mistaken and tragic conclusion that these are its primary effects, 
and that, consequently, the costs of using the law to prohibit dis­
crimination outweigh the benefits. 
